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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
CHARLES YONK, 
Deceased. 
Respondent's 
Brief 
Case No. 7244-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with the statement of facts 
as set forth by the appellant, they are not in dispute. 
ARGUMENT 
The only question involved in this appeal is whether, 
where a person dies intestate leaving as his only surviving 
heirs nephews and nieces, they inherit under the laws of 
this State by representation, that is, per stirpes, or per 
capita. 
The trial Court held, and properly so, that they in-
herit by representation or per stirpes. 
The right of succession to property of an ancestor is 
a mere privilege given by the State or_ Sovereign and is 
not a natural or an inherent right, ( 16 Am. Jur. page 77, 
section 12, and 26 C. J. S. page 996, section 2), and as 
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corollary to this proposition, a person seeking to inherit 
must look soley to the statutes in determining what in-
terest he takes. ( 16 Am. Jur. page 783, section 18, 26 
C.J.S. 1004, section 6.) 
As to the construction of statutes of succession by; the 
Courts, the editors of American Jurisprudence and Corpus 
Juris Secundum have set forth the rules as follows: 
"18. Generally. The general rules of statutory con-
struction govern the constru~tion of statutes of des-
cent and distribution. The fundamental rule is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the leg-
islature. This intention, however, must be the in-
tention as expressed in the statute itself, and, where 
the meaning of the language is plain, it must be given 
effect by the courts. The spirit of the statute, it is 
said, must be extracted from the works, and not from 
conjecture aliunde. The statute cannot be changed 
by the court in order to make it conform to its con-
· ception of right and justice in particular cases ~ 
( 16 Am. Jur. 783, section 18.) 
"~ ~ ~ Rules of law, rather than equitable principles, 
are to be applied in the construction of the statute; 
and, the court should endeavor to give effect to the 
legislature'sintent, irrespective of the intestate's intent; 
and where the meaning of the language employed 
in the statute is explicit and unmistakable, the court 
will not substitute its will for that of the legislature; 
or give the words used any interpretation other than 
that which they literally import, or ingraft an excep-
tion where none exists in the language of the statute. 
~ ~ ~ ( 26 C.J.S. page 1006, section 6.) 
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The la\v of succession in this state is ·controlled by 
101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943. This section is complete and com-
prehensive as to descent and distribution, and was in-
tended to, and does, cover all situations therein arising. 
The statute as it now stands is the same as enacted by the 
legislature in 1933 and therein known as 101-4-5, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. The law of succession in 1907 was 
known as Section 2828, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907. 
This section was later known in the Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1917, as Section 6408. 
In setting forth the law of succession our legislature 
generally placed heirs into three classes, and provided for 
their various interests accordingly. That is, ( 1) lineal 
descendants; ( 2) collateral des~endants; and ( 3) next of 
kin. 
The interest of lineal descendants is controlled by 
sub-sections 1, 2, 7, and 8 of 101-4-5, U.C.A., 1943; collat-
eral heirs by sub-sections 3 and 4, 101-4-5, U.C.A., 1943; 
next of kin, that is, collateral heirs after "children and 
grandchildren of a deceased brother and sister" is control-
led by sub-section 6, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943. Where there 
are no lineal descendants or collateral heirs, or next of kin, 
decedent's property escheat~ to the State for the benefit 
of the school fund. (Sub-section 9, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943.) 
From 1907 to the present date our statutes regarding 
the laws of succession have remained unchanged except 
for two amendments. In 1925 the legislature raised the 
amount a surviving spouse could inherit from $5,000.00 
to $25,000.00 before the excess thereof was distributed 
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equally between .the surviving spouse and the mother and 
father, qr either of them, of the decedent. (Laws of Utah, 
1925, page 195.) In 1933 the law of succession was sub-
stantially amended by our legislature. Although the sub-
paragraphs were maintained, it dropped the sub-titles, fur-
ther amending sub-sections 3, 4 and 6. 
Sub-section 3 deals with the incident where a dece-
dent dies leaving a spouse but no issue. Prior to 1933 that 
portion of the sub-section pertinent to this discussion read 
as follows: 
"~ ~ ~ If there be no father or mother, then one-half 
of such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers 
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children of any 
deceased brothers or sisters by right of representa-
tion." 
In 1933 the legislature, after the word "children," 
inserted the words "or grandchildren'' in this sub-para-
graph, and sub-section 3 as amended read: 
CCI£ there be no father nor mother, then one-half of 
such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers and 
sisters of the decedent, and to the children or grand-
children of any deceased brother and sister by right 
or representaion." (Italics added.) 
The purpose of this amendment was to bring the law 
in harmony in all its aspects regarding the distribution of 
property to collateral heirs, as will be further noted, herein, 
thus providing that in each instance, collateral heirs to and 
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including children and grandchildren of deceased bro-
thers and sisters should inherit per stirpes, or by repre-
sentation. 
The question to be decided here is controlled by sub-
sections 4 and 6 of the present act and they are the same 
as sub-sections 4 and 6 of the 1933 act. These sub-sections 
prior to 1933 read as follows: 
( 4) "When brothers and sisters inherit all: If there 
be neither issue, husband, wife, father nor mother, 
then in equal shares to the brothers and sisters of the 
decedent, and -to the children of any deceased bro-
ther or sister by right of representation., 
( 6) "Where next of kin inherit: If the decede~t 
leave neither issue, husband, wife, father, mother, 
brother, nor sister, the estate must go to the next of 
kin in equal degree, excepting that when there are 
two or more collateral kindred in equal degree but 
claiming through different ancestors, then that claim-
ing through the nearest ancestor must be preferredito 
those claiming through an ancestor more remote." 
Thereafter, in 1933, these sub-sections were amended 
to read as follows: 
" ( 4) If there is neither issue, husband, wife, father 
nor mother, then in equal shares to the brothers and 
sisters of the decedent, and to the children, or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister by right of 
representation." 
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" ( 6) If the decedent leaves neither issue, husband, 
wife, father, mother, brother nor sister, nor children 
or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister, 
the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree, 
excepting that when there are two or more collateral 
kindred in equal degree but claiming through differ-
ent ancestors, those who claim the nearest ancestor 
must be preferred to those claiming through an an-
cestor more remote." (Italics supplied.) 
The underscoring represents that portion of the sta-
tute which was added by the legislature in its amendment 
of 1933. 
The foregoing sub-sections 4 and 6 are the sub-sec-
tions that the appellant would have the court believe are 
ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain. We believe, how-
ever, that a mere perusal of them refutes such an assertion. 
In determining the question before the court they must 
be read together. Prior to 1933, collateral heirs after 
brothers and sisters were treated as next of kin, where 
there was no surviving brother or sister, (subsection 6). 
However, by the amendments of 1933, our legislature pro-
vided that "childr~n or grandchildren of any deceased 
brother or sister" of a decedent would not thereafter in-
herit as next of kin under the provisions of subsection 6-
they were expressly excluded from its provisions, but they 
would inherit as collateral descendents under subsection 
4. 
Sub-section 4 says: 
c'And the children or grandchildren of any deceased 
brother or sister by right of representation," 
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and the legislature defined the term "inherit by repre-
sentationn as follows: 
"\) ~ \) "by right of representation" takes place when 
the descendant of anv deceased heir take the same 
share or right in the estate of another person that 
their parents would have taken if living 0 0 ~ ." ( 101-
4-23). 
AUTHORITIES 
As stated before, whatever interest the heirs in this 
case receive is controlled by ;the statutes. 26 C.J.S. page 
1030, section 23, says: 
"~ ~ 0 There are exceptions to this rule, under the 
statutes of a few states, it being held in such states 
that nephews and nieces, although they alone are the 
heirs or next of kin, take the real and personal pro-
perty per stirpes~ ~ ~;,;,. (Underscoring added) 
Also to the same effect is American Jurisprudence. 
16 Am. Jur. page 811; section 42: 
"~ ~ ~where all of those who take are more remotely 
removed from the ancestor than children but are all 
of equal degree of relationship; whether or not they 
take per capita or per stirpes depends on the statute 
and the construction given it. The general rule is 
that they take per capita; this is true, at least, where 
th<_>se who take are grandchildren or great-grand-
children. In a few jurisdictions, however, even in 
such a case, the heirs take per stirpes and not per 
capita. A similiar difference of rule prevails where 
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the inheritance falls to collateral kindred. In some 
jurisdictions, where all the collaterals entitled to claim 
are equally near of kin - for instance, second cousins, 
twice removed - they take per capita, because they 
all take in their own right. In other jurisdictions the 
view is taken that they take per stirpes. Where those 
who take are of different degrees of relationship, so 
that some claim as representatives of others, such 
representatives take per stirpes. Where the estate 
falls to collaterals beyond the statutory limitation of 
the right to take by representation, they take per 
capita.~ ~ ~ ." (Italics supplied.) 
The trial courts construction of our act to the effect 
that the nephews and nieces of the decedent in this case-
take by representation or per stirpes and not per capita, 
is not only clear from the act itself, but such is supported 
by the authorities as well, for in every instance in which 
courts have construed statutes substantially the same as 
ours, they have without exception so held. 
In the case of In Re Swenson et. al vs. Lewis, 160 
N. W. 253, the Supreme Court of ~1innesota was con-
cerned with the history of legislation regarding tJieir suc-
cession laws similar to dur own. Prior to 1905, the perti-
nent parts of their act to this discussion read: 
"Subsection 5. If the intestate leaves no issue, nor 
wife, nor husband, nor father, nor mother, his estate 
shall descend in equal shares to his brothers and 
sisters and to the lawful issue of any brother or sister 
by right of representation.", 
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and subsection 6 of their act read: 
''If the intestate leaves no issue and no husband or 
wife, and no father, mother, brother, or sister, his 
estate shall descend to his next of kin in equal degree 
In 1905, the legislature of Nlinnesota amended its 
succession laws, subsection 5 becoming subsection 4 of 
the new act. In substance it remained, however, un-
changed: It read: 
"If there is neither surviving issue, nor spouse, nor 
father, nor mother, his estate shall descend in equal 
shares to his brothers and sisters and to the Ia wful 
issue of any brother or sister by right of represent-
ation." 
Subsection 6 became subsection 5 and read as fol-
lows: 
"If the intestate leave neither issue, spouse, father~ 
mother, brother nor sister, nor living issue of any de-
ceased brother or sister, his estate shall descend to 
his next of kin in equal degree, excepting that when 
there are two or more co~ateral kindred in equal de-
gree but claiming through different ancestors, those 
who claim through the nearest ancestor shall be pre-
ferred to those claiming through an ancestor more 
remote." 
The underscoring represents the words in italics as 
they appear in the decision. The Court said: 
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"~ ~ ~subdivision 5 of the former statute became sub-
division 4 of the present statute without change in 
substance. But subdivision 6 of the former statute, 
was changed in- substance by inserting the words, 
"nor living issue of any deceased brother or sister," 
so that it now reads as printed above, the inserted 
words being in italics. 
By the first subdivision of both statutes, if the sur-
viving kin first in the line of descent are issue of the 
decedent, they take by right of representation, that 
is, per stirpes; and neither statute makes any other 
or different provision for a case in which there are 
no living c~ildren of the decedent and the first in the 
line of desc~nt are his grandchildren. Under both 
statutes the per stirpes rule continues so long as issue 
of the decedent be living. By the fifth subdivision 
of the former statute which is the same in substance 
as the fourth division of the present statute, if the 
first in the line of descent are brothers and sisters, 
they also take by right of representation. The pres-
ent statute makes no other or different provisiom_ 
for a case in which there are no living brothers or 
sisters and the first in the line of descent are nephews 
and nieces or their issue; but by subdivision 6 of the 
former statute, if there were no living brothers or 
sisters and the first in line of descent were nephews 
and nieces or kin of a more remote degree, they took 
per capita and not per stirpes. The former statute 
made the change from the per stirpes rule to the per 
capita rule at the point where there were no living 
brothers or sisters and the first in the line of descent 
10 
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tvere nephews and nieces or kin of a more remote de-
gree. The present statute makes the change from the 
per stirpes rule to the per capita rule at the point 
where there are no living brothers or sisters, "nor liv-
ing issue of any deceased brother or sister," and the 
first in the line of descent are kin of a more remote 
degree than a brother or sister. The present statute 
continues the pe·r stirpes rule so long as issue of a 
brother or sister be living. It follows that in the 
present case the nephews and nieces take per stirpes 
and not per capita. o o on (Italics supplied.) 
The perogative Court of New Jersey in the Appeal 
of Messler, et. al 127 A. 85, also held that where nephews 
and nieces were the only surviving h~irs that they inher-
ited by representation. The Court said: 
" ( 1) In 1918 the Legislature, by c~apter 63 of the 
Laws of that year (P.L. 1918, p. 197), amended sub-
sections 3 and 4 of section 69 chapter 47 of the Acts 
of 1914 (P.L. 1914, p. 69) which had amended cer-
tain subsections of section 169 of subdivision 14, relat-
ing to distribution under the Orphans' Court Act, 
(Comp. St. vol. 3, page 3874, et. seq.) 
The amendments to subsections 3 and 4, made by the 
Act of 1918, make these subsections now read as fol-
lows: 
'Subsection 3: If there be no husband or widow, as 
the case may be, then all of the said estate to be dis-
tributed equally to and among the children; and in 
case there be no child, nor any legal representative 
11 
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of any child, then equally among the parents and 
brothers and sisters, and the representatives of de-
ceased brothers and sisters; provided, that no repre-
sentation shall be admitted among collaterals after 
deceased brothers' and sisters' children'. 
Subsection 4: 'If there be no husband or widow, 
child or any legal representative of any child, nor a 
parent, brother or sister, nor the representative of a 
deceased brother or sister, then all of the estate to be 
distributed equally to the next of kindred, in equal 
degree, of or unto the intestate and their legal repre-
sentatives as aforesaid.' 
The words in italics are the pertinent parts of the 
amendments with which we are now concerned, and 
it is clear that the effect of these amendments is to 
take the children or representatives of deceased bro-
thers and sisters of the ;ntestate out of their former 
classification as next of kin of the decedent and to 
place them among the collateral relatives of the inte-
state among whom the statute now directs the per-
sonal estate shall be equally divided, before other 
next of kin of more remote degree can participate in 
its distribution." 
The Court again said: 
''The further effect of the amended statute is that it 
deprives nieces and nephews, in equal degree, in 
their capacity as the representatives of deceased bro-
thers and sisters of the intestate, of the possibility of 
distribution being made among them per capita, as 
12 
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next of kin, for the terms of the statute, in its refer-
ence to the representatives of deceased brothers and 
sisters, are not mere \vords of description, but are 
clearly intended to indicate the capacity in which the 
(children) representati,·es of deceased brothers and 
sisters of decedent shall take part or share of the 
estate." 
In the case of Housely v. laster, et. al. 140 S.W. 2d. 
146, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in interpreting sta-
tutes substantially the same as our own, reached the same 
conclusion. The Court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the probate judge decided 
the question properly. Section 8389 of the Code of 
1932 regulates the distribution of the surplus person-
alty of an intestate. Subsection 5 of that statute pro-
vides: 
"If no father or mother, to brothers and sisters, or the 
children of such brothers and sisters representing 
them, equally." 
It should be observed that the children of brothers 
and sisters, under this statute, take as representatives 
of such brothers and sisters, - each representative 
or representative group, equally." 
The Court again said: 
"That our construction is ~orr~ct is indicated by sub-
section 6 of section 8389 providing "If no brother or 
sister, or their children, to every of the next of kin of 
13 
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the intestate who are in equal degree, equally." So, 
after passing the children of brothers and sisters, dis-
tribution is to the next of kin, eq~ally, per capita. 
Distribution, to the children of brothers and sisters, 
however, is not made to such children as next of kin, 
but as representatives of their parents. This is made 
clear in Lewis V. Claiborne, supra. 
Section 8390 of the Code provides: "There is no re-
presentation among collaterals, after brothers' and 
sisters' children." Up to the point indicated, how-
ever, there is representation among collaterals, that is, 
up to and including brothers' and sisters' children. 
We are referred by counsel to Sizer's Prichard Law of 
Wills and Executors, section 767, as expressing views 
contrary to those above indicated. Plainly, however, 
the learned author was discussing distribution among 
lineal distributees, not among collateral distributees." 
CALIFORNIA DECISIONS SUSTAIN THE RULE 
THAT TI-IE HEIRS HERIN INHERIT BY 
REPRESENTATION OR PER STIRPES 
The crux of appellant's argument is merely this, that 
inasmuch as the law of succession does not effect the result 
he wishes, that "'this Court shall arbitrarily ignore the ex-
press language of the statute, and judiciously legislate 
the result he desires. Notwithstanding his declaration 
that the provisions of subsection 6, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943, 
does not apply, he nevertheless asks the Court to disre-
gard its provisions and hold that the heirs herein take as 
next of kin thereunder. 
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His first proposition is merely this, that subsection 
4 of our act does not apply because there is no surviving· 
brother or sister. This, because of the result reached by 
the California Court in the case of Estate of Nigro, 156·, 
P. 1019, and in Re Ross Estate, 202 P. 641. It is true that 
such was their holding. However, the appellant failed to 
advise the Court that the conclusion reached by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court ·was the result of the interpreta-
tion of subsections 3 and 5 of the California act and not 
only subsection 3 thereof as the appellant would have the 
Court believe. The court said that subsections 3 and5 
of its act must be read together. Subsection 3 of the 
California act and subsection 4 of our act are substantially 
the same, whereas subsection 5 of the California act and 
subsection 6 of our act are materially ~ifferent. 
The California Court said because children or grand-
children of a deceased brother and sister inherited as next 
of kin, where there is no surviving brother or sister under 
subsection 5, that subsection 3 did not apply. In contrast 
to this, however, our act provides that ccchildren or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister" are expressly 
excluded from inheriting as next of kin under subsection 
6, and they can only inherit under subsection 4, which 
provides for inheritance by representation. Thus, if we 
follow the reasoning of the California· decisions these 
cases support the respondent's position. 
In addition to the foregoing decisions, the appellant 
also cites the California case of Johns v. Scobie, 86 P. 2d. 
820, 121 A.L.R. 414, as holding that nephews and nieces 
inherit per capita. However, such was not its holding, 
15 
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although it c~ntained a fugitive remark to that effect. 
This was a case involvi~g the question of the validity of 
the delivery of a deed; the Court finding that there was 
no legal delivery then considered the question of whether 
the gran~ee had acquired title by adverse possession. In 
this respect it further found that inasmuch as the grantor 
died intestate leaving surviving him only nephews and 
nieces, of whom the grantee was one, that the grantee 
occupied the property as a tenant in common with the 
other nephews and nieces and that there was nothing in 
the record to establish the elements of a hostile or an 
adverse claim. 
The question of what interest the heirs take as be-
tween themselves was not involved; it was not probative 
to the decision, and the fugitive remarks regarding a per 
capita basis of inheritance were purely dicta. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California has 
laid down a rule that under its present law of succession, 
nephews and nieces, where the sole heirs, inherit by re-
presentation or per stirpes. Such is the holding in the 
case of Van Tiger vs. The Superior Court in and for Los 
Angeles County, 60 P. 2d. 85'1. The California Court had 
before it for consideration sections 225 and 226, Cali-
fornia Probate Code, and they read as follows: 
''225. No surviving spouse or issue. If decedent 
leaves neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to 
his parents in equal sha~es, or if either is dead, to 
the survivors, or if both are dead, in equal shares to 
his brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of the 
deceased brothers and sisters by right of representa-
tion. 
16 
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226. If decedent leaves neither issue, spouse, par-
ent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceased bro-
ther or sister, the estate goes to the next of kin in 
equal degree., 
In this case the decedent left surviving him only 
nephews and nieces. The administratrix filed her peti-
tion praying that the estate be distributed per capita. It 
was uncontested. The Court, however, entered its order 
distributing the estate per stirpes. The Administratrix 
~ought to have the order changed effecting the distribu-
tion on a per capita basis, which she claimed was the orig-
inal order of the court, and that the entry of the order 
on a per stirpes basis was an error of the Clerk. At page 
853, the Court said: 
"It will be observed that the respondent does not 
claim that the facts of the case are otherwise than as 
set out in the decree nor that the decree does not 
distribute the estate exactly as the law directs. The 
decree speaks the tn1th as to the facts in the case. 
The decree correctly found the facts with regard to 
the relationship of the parties to be as above set forth 
and no other distribution would have been proper 
under the facts of the case and the law applicable 
thereto. The rights of the respondent were not im-
paired by the decree as entered. Indeed it is no-
where claimed in the answer of respondent that her 
rights were impaired by the decree. Thus the only 
alleged mistake (so-called) is merely that the clerk 
correctly entered the decree in compliance with the 
law and the admitted facts. There was no mistake. 
17 
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0 0 # It seems to be the respondent's contention 
that if she could get the judgment "corrected" so as 
to distribute the estate per capita instead of per 
stirpes, then the judgment would contain a judicial 
error and could not now be corrected. She says: "If, 
in its order of January 10, 1934 (the date of the hear-
ing), the Court did err in ordering a per capita in-
stead of a per stirpes, distribution, that error, if error 
there was, was a judicial error, and not a mere mistake 
of the clerk. Such error, therefore, if error there was, 
could not be corrected after the clerk had entered the 
decree of distribution" 0 0 #. 
FURTHER ANSWER 
The case of the Appeal of Hall et. al. 102 A 977, 
Maine, a decision cited by appellant, likewise does not 
support his position. This decision was based on a statute 
substantially the same as existed in the State of California 
at the time of the Nigro and In Re Ross Estate decisions 
and the the Court reached its decisions along the same 
lines of reasoning as did the California Court in the Nigro 
and In Re Ross cases. 
The mere setting forth of the statutory provisions con-
strued by the Maine Court and again repeating the pro-
visions of subsection 6 of our act, will demonstrate that 
this case also supports the respondent's position. Sub-
section 6 of the Maine statute said: 
"If no issue, father, mother, brother or sister, it des-
cends to his next of kin in equal shares 0 0 0 " 
Subsection 6 of our Act savs: 
. .,. 
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"If the decedent leaves no issue, huband, wife, father, 
1nother, brother nor sister, nor children or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister, the es-
tate must go to the next of kin in equal degree \) 0 \)". 
Appellant, in further support of his proposition, 
quoted from 26 C.J.S., page 1029 (page 27, appellant's 
brief.) However, for son1e reason unknown to the respon-
dent, he omitted after the word "permitted," "See Infra 
section 23." Section 23 deals fully with representation 
and taking per capita, and therein it recognizes that: 
"Under the stah1tes of a few states, it being held in 
such states that nephews and nieces, although they 
alone a:re the heirs or next of kin, take the real and 
personal property per stirpes." 26 C.J.S. 1030, Sec-
tion 23 supra. 
Appellant recognizes under the statutes of some 
states, that nephews and nieces, where the only survivors, 
would inherit on a per capita basis. However as repeat-
edly pointed out, whether they inherit per capita or per 
, stirpes depends upon the particular statute of each state. 
The Ohio case of Kinkaid v. Cronin, 22 N.E. 2d. 576, 
although cited by appellant in support of his proposition, 
does not sustain it because of the particular wording of the 
Ohio statute. This case merely held that in interpreting 
section 10503-7. General Code, that its provisions ap-
plied to collateral as well as lineal descendants. 
"
0 0 0 The estate shall pass to such persons of equal 
degree of consanguinity of such intestate in equal 
parts, however remote from the intestate such equal 
and common degree of consanguinity may be." 
19 
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The Ohio Court in the case of Snodgrass v. Bedell, 16 
N.E. 2d. 646, a decision cited in the foregoing case, said: 
"That the language makes its provisions apply to 
collateral heirs as well as lineal heirs. It is not limited 
to those lineal descendants in a direct line, but in-
cludes those of a more remote degree of con-
sanguinity to the intestate. In fact, it says that the 
per capita or equal division shall apply "however 
remote" the relationship may be from the intestate." 
Appellant's concern with the law of escheat can be 
disposed of in a few words. In his hypothetical case, the 
property would all vest in the surviving heirs - the heirs 
of the surviving brothers. There would be no escheat to 
the state. This is so elementary that it is unnecessary to 
refer to the authorities in support of it. 
The appellant has referred to the report of the Code 
Commissioners, and although under the·rules as laid down 
by the Editors of An1erican Jurisprudence and Corpus 
Juris, cited by. him, it is not applicable hereto, as refer-
ence is not to be made to such report where the language 
of the statute is clear and unambiguous; 
"The rule does not prevail where the language used 
in the statute is clear and unambiguous." 50 Am. Jur, 
page 469, section 454. 
The report, nevertheless, supports the fact that the legis-
lature not only changed the law by its amendments of 
1933, but it intended to do so. 
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The Amendments corrected the evils of the statute 
as it existed prior thereto, namely, by them it provided 
that grandchildren of a deceased brother or sister would. 
inherit as collateral heirs without the survival of the 
grandparents, and that all collateral heirs would inherit 
by representation whether of equal degree or not. 
In this connection, the appellant writes a great deal 
about justice and injustice. He says that it is injustice to 
invoke, as the statute provides, the law of representation 
in the case of collateral heirs where of equal degree. In 
this respect, our legislature tmquestionably believed that 
the right of representation should be applied in the case 
of collateral heirs, for it clearly and unambiguously so 
provided,. and in this respect, it is not alone, for Cali .. 
fomia, New Jersey and Tennessee have so provided, and 
we do not know how many other legislatures have done 
so, for we have attempted to marshall only the statutes 
of the states regarding the question of succession, where 
there has been a judicial interpretation. 
The appellanfs citations of authorities on the question 
of statutory construction again sustains the Trial Courf s 
construction of our law of succession as amended in the 
Revised Code of 133, for they all lay down the rule that 
where the revised law in clear and unambiguous terms 
made a change in the prior law, such change must be 
given effect. The Editors of American Jurisprudence and 
Corpus Juris says: 
"(1: <t <tin any event, where an intention to change the 
meaning of a statute incorporated in a revision or 
code is clear, the presumption that no change was 
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intended must yield to the fact, and the intention to 
make the change will be given effect. Moreover, it 
is a general rule that in the construction of compila-
tions, :revisions or codes, when a provision is plain 
and unambiguous the court cannot refer to the origi-
nal statute for the purpose of ascertaining its mean-
ing. In such case, a doubt or ambiguity in the mean-
ing of the revised statute may not be raised by refer-
ence to the former statutes of which it is a revision." 
50 Am. Jur. page 466, section 447. 
"Revisions and Codes. ( 1) In General. Courts 
should not unsettle the force of every change made 
in a plainly worded revision by inquiring into the 
authority of the revisers to make such change. So 
where the meaning of the language of a revision or 
code is plain and unambiguous, it must be construed 
without resort to the original statutes which have 
been brought into it; but wherever necessary to con-
strue doubtful language in the revision; the original 
acts may be consulted to determine the meaning in-
tended, since it is presumed that no substanial change 
was intended. In other words, reference may be had 
to antecedent legislation only to solve a doubt, not 
to create one. ~ ~ ~,59 C.J)'- page 1098, section 468. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of In 
Re Swenson:>s Estate, 160 N. W. 253, supra, wherein, as 
was previously pointed out, the Court was dealing with 
the history of the law of succession similar to that in-
volved in this case, at page 2.55, ·the Court said: 
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"Appellant invokes the rule that the Revised Laws of 
1905 are presumed to have continued the pre-existing· 
law unchanged unless an intention to change it clear-
ly appears. This rule is well settled; but it is equally 
\veil settled that \vhere the Revised Laws, in clear 
and unambiguous tern1s, made a change i!l the prior 
la\v, such change must be given effect. State v. 
Stroschein, 99 Minn. 248, 109 N. W. 235; State v. 
Minneapolis ~lilk Co. 124 Minn. 34, 144 N. W. 417, 
51 L. R. A. ( N.S.) 244; Williams v. Reid, 130 Minn. 
256, 153 N. W. 324, 593. 
In the present case the law as revised is clear and 
tmambiguous, and n1anifests a plain intent to change 
the prior law. There is no rule of construction which 
will permit us to hold that the Legislature intende9. 
to continue the former statute by which a surviving 
father took the whole estate to the entire exclusion of 
a surviving mother. Neither is there any rule which 
will permit us to disregard the new clause. which the 
Legislature inserted in subdivision 5 of the present 
Statute. The insertion of this clause leaves the sta-
tute clear and unambiguous, and under such circum-
stances we cannot reject this clause nor declare it 
meaningless, but must give it the effect which the 
Legislature plainly intended." 
There is no dispute that the legislature provided that 
in all instances where the lineal descendants of a decedent 
are in equal degree they inherit equally, (Subsections 1, 
2, 7, and 8, 101-4-5, U.C.A. 1943). However, the legisla-
ture, just as, expressly declared, that the collateral heirs 
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of a decedent to and including "children and grandchil-
dren of any deceased brother or sister," where equal, in-
herit by representation, (subsections . 3 and 4, 101-4-5~ 
U.C.A. 1943.) Had the legislature intended that collateral 
heirs to and including "children and grandchildren of in-
testate's brother and sister" should inherit equally where 
of equal d~gree, it would have so declared, as it did in 
the case of lineal descendents. To the contrary, however, 
it provided that they should inherit by representation. 
The legislature w.as explicit in its language regarding 
both lineal and collateral descenden,ts. It treated lineal 
descendents as a class and collateral descendents as an-
other class. In one instance, lineal descendents, where 
equal, they inherit equally. In the second instance, col-
lateral heirs, where equal, they nevertheless inherit by 
representation. This is the law as declared by the legis-
lature. 
Respectfully submitted, 
·NEWEL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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